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LOGIC OF DESCRIPTIONS.
A NEW APPROACH TO THE FOUNDATIONS
OF MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE
Abstract. We study a new formal logic LD introduced by Prof. Grzegorczyk.
The logic is based on so-called descriptive equivalence, corresponding to the idea
of shared meaning rather than shared truth value. We construct a semantics
for LD based on a new type of algebras and prove its soundness and complete-
ness. We further show several examples of classical laws that hold for LD as
well as laws that fail. Finally, we list a number of open problems.
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1. Introduction
Logic arose from philosophical and linguistic reflections that began in an-
cient Greece and later spread throughout Europe. In the 20th century, formal
logical systems, especially for classical two-valued logic, achieved perfection
and became the gold standard in the foundations of mathematics (and of
science in general). However, every now and then a philosopher, a logician
or a mathematician has expressed doubts and objections concerning this
standard. These objections have been made on various grounds, and many
so-called “non-classical” logics have been proposed to rectify the perceived
faults, such as modal, intuitionistic, conditional, relevant, paraconsistent,
free, quantum, fuzzy, independence-friendly, and so on. Nevertheless, none
of these logics has been generally accepted as the right one, and a resolu-
tion to the arguments about their practical and philosophical merits and
drawbacks is nowhere in sight.
Historically, logic was born out of attempts to explain the structure of
human reasoning. It should be emphasized that ancient logicians did not
aspire to create an abstract model of human thought, akin to modern at-
tempts at passing the Turing test. The lofty goal of their reflections on
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logical principles was to find their way into the very essence of reality. This
goal, however utopian it may have been, was consistently pursued by the
philosophers who brought forth the logic revolution. However, the invention
of formal methods in mathematics – and hence a means to achieve unprece-
dented rigour – led to logic being “taken over” by engineers and computer
scientists. This observation is not meant as a criticism. The results obtained
in the field of mathematical logic, as well as its fruitful applications in in-
formation technology are impressive indeed. Nevertheless, despite the great
success of logic in these areas, we may still ask whether the formal sys-
tems commonly used in mathematical logic can serve as adequate tools for
understanding human reasoning.
Prof. Grzegorczyk treats this question in his recent article [2011], which
can be described as a manifesto calling for the creation of new logical prin-
ciples suitable for scientific description of reality and for the revision of the
current standard; that is, various versions of classical two-valued logic.
One of Prof. Grzegorczyk’s objections to classical logic is the fact that
it “restricts itself to considering only one, admittedly the most important,
parameter of the content of a claim, namely its truth value” [2011, p. 446],
which – as the author points out – is the source of the paradoxical nature
of certain tautologies involving implication and equivalence, such as false
implies everything, anything implies the truth, any true sentences are equiv-
alent regardless of their content. As the author explains, such tautologies
are useful in formal deductions in the technical sense, but do not otherwise
contribute to understanding. Of course, the paradoxes of material implica-
tion have been widely discussed elsewhere, and several non-classical logics
have been created in order to solve them. However, the main point of the
paper does not involve material implication as such, but rather the prob-
lematic nature of material equivalence, which is clearly seen in the following
example. In mathematics, one may say that the equations x + 2 = 3 and
1−x = 0 “mean the same” or “say the same thing in different ways” because
they are logically equivalent; that is, their truth values are the same for any
given value of x. On the other hand, any two true propositions are equiva-
lent to each other. So, if we consistently speak of equivalent propositions as
“meaning the same”, we end up claiming that “2 + 2 = 4” means the same
as “Warsaw lies on the Vistula river.” According to Prof. Grzegorczyk, this
shows that
Such combined propositions, established as equivalences according to classical
formal logic, do not lead to anything interesting. The paradoxical nature of
the classical concept of equivalence arises because we may expect equivalence
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to open the possibility of linking the content of one claim with that of the
other. We would like equivalent sentences not only to be equally true, but also
to speak about the same subject. It seems (from a philosophical point
of view) that claims that are not connected by a common subject cannot be
treated as fully equivalent. [2011, p. 447]
To remedy the ills of classical equivalence and to avoid the above-
mentioned paradox, we should carefully distinguish between two kinds of
equivalence, which are:
1. “truth-functional equivalence” – the condition that the truth values of
two propositions are the same; this is classical equivalence ↔ (“coarse,
even cynically paradoxical”).
2. “descriptive equivalence”1 – the condition that the meanings of two
propositions are the same (“more subtle, but not totally determined,
allowing for an intuitive interpretation of being connected by a shared
subject”).
Introducing a new connective involves describing its usage, which natu-
rally leads one to consider a new logical formalism in which the classical
equivalence connective ↔ has been replaced with a descriptive equivalence
connective, which, according to Prof. Grzegorczyk, better reflects human
ways of thinking.
We will use the symbol ≡ to denote the new connective. The new logic,
denoted here by LD, is defined by rules of inference and a set of axioms. In
the article [Grzegorczyk, 2011], a number of important questions concern-
ing the new logic are raised. Firstly, do the new equivalence and the corre-
sponding implication coincide with their respective classical counterparts?
Secondly, can we define a semantics for which the given syntactic proof
system is sound and complete?
In the present article, we analyze the logic LD as presented in [Grze-
gorczyk, 2011]. We will show that the descriptive equivalence connective is
indeed different from the classical one. In fact, our further results show that
the new logic is substantially different from many other known ones, repre-
senting various kinds of non-classical logics. One of our central results is the
construction of a semantics for LD, which, in turn, allows us to prove fur-
ther, rather peculiar, properties of LD, shedding some light on the obscure
secrets of descriptive equivalence.
1 In a draft version of the article [Grzegorczyk, 2011], the new connective is called the
equimeaning connective, while in its final, published version, it is named the perceptive
equivalence connective. Later on, Prof. Grzegorczyk came to the conclusion that the most
fitting name for the new connective is the descriptive equivalence connective, and this is
the terminological convention we will follow.
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It is worth noting that the distinction between classical and descriptive
equivalence is essentially the same as the distinction between the truth value
and the meaning of a sentence. Roman Suszko, among others, argued for
the need, and even necessity, to consider the latter distinction when build-
ing the semantical basis for a logical system, and he introduced so-called
non-Fregean logic as a formalization of this idea (see [Suszko, 1968]). The
sentential version of non-Fregean logic (called Sentential Calculus with Iden-
tity, SCI) is obtained from classical sentential logic by adding a new identity
connective. Suszko’s philosophical motivations for creating SCI were similar
to those of Prof. Grzegorczyk for creating LD. By coincidence, both of them
chose the symbol ≡ for essentially the same purpose: to denote descriptive
equivalence in LD and identity of sentences in SCI. However, their intuitions
and underlying philosophical assumptions have led to two very different for-
malisms. The logic SCI is based on classical logic, which is simply extended
by adding new axioms expressing the properties of sentential identity. On
the other hand, LD is built from the ground up to reflect the interactions
between descriptive equivalence and the basic connectives of negation, dis-
junction and conjunction, introducing counterparts of many classical laws
involving equivalence and omitting others. Nevertheless, the logics of Suszko
and Grzegorczyk have many common elements, which can be seen especially
in our construction of a semantics for LD.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the language
and the Hilbert-style axiomatization of LD with examples of LD-provable
formulas. We present a semantics and prove its soundness and completeness
in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss some interesting properties of LD, in
particular classical results that fail for LD and the independence of the ax-
ioms. In Section 5, we study two proposed alternative formulations of LD,
showing how they fail to fulfill the philosophical motivations behind LD.
Conclusions and open problems are presented in Section 6. To avoid clut-
tering the main text with excessive tables, we present most example models
in the Appendix.
Our results rely heavily on computer software for semi-automatic proof
generation and model checking, written by the second author. The software
and associated files are available upon request.
2. Logic LD: axiomatization
Logic LD belongs to the family of propositional logics. The vocabulary of
the logic LD consists of the following pairwise disjoint sets of symbols:
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• V = {p0, p1, p2, . . .} – an infinite countable set of propositional variables,
• {¬,∨,∧,≡} – propositional operations of negation ¬, disjunction ∨,
conjunction ∧, and descriptive equivalence ≡.
In practice, we will use the symbols p, q, r instead of the “official” sub-
scripted ones.
As usual in propositional logics, we define the set of LD-formulas as the
smallest set that contains all the propositional variables and is closed under
all the propositional operations. The logic LD is given by the Hilbert-style
axiomatization. Below we list the axioms and rules of inference of LD in
their original forms from [Grzegorczyk, 2011].
Axioms:2
Ax1 p ≡ p
Ax2 (p ≡ q) ≡ (q ≡ p)
Ax3 (p ≡ q) ≡ [(p ≡ q) ∧ ((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r))]
Ax4 (p ≡ q) ≡ (¬p ≡ ¬q)
Ax5 (p ≡ q) ≡ [(p ≡ q) ∧ ((p ∨ r) ≡ (q ∨ r))]
Ax6 (p ≡ q) ≡ [(p ≡ q) ∧ ((p ∧ r) ≡ (q ∧ r))]
Ax7 (p ∨ q) ≡ (q ∨ p)
Ax8 (p ∨ (q ∨ r)) ≡ ((p ∨ q) ∨ r)
Ax9 p ≡ (p ∨ p)
Ax10 (p ∧ q) ≡ (q ∧ p)
Ax11 (p ∧ (q ∧ r)) ≡ ((p ∧ q) ∧ r)
Ax12 p ≡ (p ∧ p)
Ax13 (p ∧ (q ∨ r)) ≡ ((p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r))
Ax14 (p ∨ (q ∧ r)) ≡ ((p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r))
Ax15 ¬(p ∨ q) ≡ (¬p ∧ ¬q)
Ax16 ¬(p ∧ q) ≡ (¬p ∨ ¬q)
Ax17 ¬¬p ≡ p
Ax18 ¬(p ∧ ¬p)
Observe that among the eighteen axioms of LD, only one axiom, namely
Ax18, does not involve the descriptive equivalence connective. Moreover,
the rest of the axioms can be divided into three groups, with Ax3 playing
a double role. First, the axioms Ax1–Ax3 express the basic properties of
2 Here we adopt a revised form of the axiom Ax3, presented in Errata 2012 to [Grze-
gorczyk, 2011]. We will discuss the original form in Section 5.
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descriptive equivalence, namely its reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity.
Axioms Ax3–Ax6 formulate the idea that equals can be substituted for each
other. Axioms Ax7–Ax17 state some basic properties of equivalence of com-
pound formulas built with the classical connectives of negation, conjunction,
and disjunction, which are: associativity, commutativity, and idempotency
of conjunction and disjunction (axioms Ax7–Ax12), distributivity of conjunc-
tion (resp. disjunction) over disjunction (resp. conjunction) (axioms Ax13
and Ax14), involution of negation that additionally satisfies de Morgan laws
(axioms Ax15–Ax17).
Rules of inference:
(MPLD)
ϕ ≡ ψ,ϕ
ψ
(Sub)
ϕ(p0, . . . , pn)
ϕ(p0/ψ0, . . . , pn//ψn)
(∧1)
ϕ,ψ
ϕ ∧ ψ
(∧2)
ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ,ψ
For technical reasons, we impose the additional restriction that the
rule (Sub) may be applied only to axioms. As in the classical case, this
restriction is not essential when no additional assumptions are used in the
proof.
The rules (Sub), (∧1), and (∧2) are standard in classical logic. However,
the crucial feature of LD is that it contains a modus ponens-type rule only
with respect to descriptive equivalence, while the classical modus ponens
rule is not present. Furthermore, LD does not have any rule for introduc-
tion or elimination of disjunction or negation. As we will show later, only
a disjunction introduction rule is derivable in LD.
An LD-formula ϕ is said to be LD-provable (⊢ ϕ for short) whenever
there exists a finite sequence ϕ1, . . . , ϕn of LD-formulas, n ≥ 1, such that
ϕn = ϕ and each ϕi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is an axiom or follows from earlier
formulas in the sequence by one of the rules of inference. If X is any set of
LD-formulas, then ϕ is said to be LD-provable from X (X ⊢ ϕ for short)
whenever there exists a finite sequence ϕ1, . . . , ϕn of LD-formulas, n ≥ 1,
such that ϕn = ϕ and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ϕi is an axiom or ϕi ∈ X
or ϕi follows from earlier formulas in the sequence by one of the rules of
inference.
Now, it is worth noting that the logic LD is consistent, as the inter-
pretation of ≡ as the usual classical equivalence yields that all the axioms
are classical tautologies and all the rules preserve classical validity. Hence,
one of all possible models of LD is the two-element Boolean algebra of the
classical propositional logic. This implies also that the formula p ≡ ¬p is
not LD-provable.
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The axiomatization of LD enables us to prove many of the classical
laws, but not all. In particular, the formula ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is LD-provable.
⊢ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ), for any LD-formula ϕ.
(1) ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) (Sub) to Ax18 for p/ϕ
(2) ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) ≡ (¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ) (Sub) to Ax16 for p/ϕ, q/¬ϕ
(3) ¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ (MPLD) to (1) and (2)
(4) (¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ) ≡ (¬¬ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) (Sub) to Ax7 for p/¬ϕ, q/¬¬ϕ
(5) ¬¬ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ (MPLD) to (3) and (4)
(6) ¬¬ϕ ≡ ϕ (Sub) to Ax17 for p/ϕ
(7) (¬¬ϕ ≡ ϕ) ≡ [(¬¬ϕ ≡ ϕ) ∧ ((¬¬ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ≡ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ))]
(Sub) to Ax5 for p/¬¬ϕ, q/ϕ, r/ϕ
(8) (¬¬ϕ ≡ ϕ) ∧ ((¬¬ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ≡ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ)) (MPLD) to (6) and (7)
(9) (¬¬ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ≡ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) (∧2) to (8)
(10) ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ (MPLD) to (5) and (9)
Also the following formula is provable in LD:
¬(ϕ ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ ψ)) ∨ ψ3.
Below we sketch its proof.
⊢ ¬(ϕ ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ ψ)) ∨ ψ, for all LD-formulas ϕ and ψ.
(1) (¬ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ψ) (Sub) to Ax18 for p/(¬ϕ ∨ ψ)
(2) (¬ϕ ∨ ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ψ)) ∨ ψ from (1) by Ax7 and Ax8
(3) ¬(ϕ ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ ψ)) ∨ ψ from (2) by Ax16
It is also easy to see that the following rule is a derived LD-rule:
(tran)
ϕ ≡ ψ,ψ ≡ ϑ
ϕ ≡ ϑ
,
which can be proved as follows:
(1) ϕ ≡ ψ
(2) ψ ≡ ϑ
(3) (ϕ ≡ ψ) ≡ [(ϕ ≡ ψ) ∧ ((ϕ ≡ ϑ) ≡ (ψ ≡ ϑ))]
(Sub) to Ax3 for p/ϕ, q/ψ, r/ϑ
(4) (ϕ ≡ ψ) ∧ ((ϕ ≡ ϑ) ≡ (ψ ≡ ϑ)) (MPLD) to (1) and (3)
(5) (ϕ ≡ ϑ) ≡ (ψ ≡ ϑ) (∧2) to (4)
3 If the usual definition of the classical implication is assumed, that is, (p → q) ≡
(¬p∨ q), then the formula ¬(ϕ∧ (¬ϕ∨ψ))∨ψ can be abbreviated as (ϕ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)) → ψ.
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(6) [(ϕ ≡ ϑ) ≡ (ψ ≡ ϑ)] ≡ [(ψ ≡ ϑ) ≡ (ϕ ≡ ϑ)]
(Sub) to Ax2 for p/(ϕ ≡ ϑ), q/(ψ ≡ ϑ)
(7) (ψ ≡ ϑ) ≡ (ϕ ≡ ϑ) (MPLD) to (5) and (6)
(8) (ϕ ≡ ϑ) (MPLD) to (2) and (7)
However, a distinguishing feature of LD is that the algebra of its for-
mulas does not form a Boolean algebra, since neither the absorption laws
p ∨ (p ∧ q) ≡ p and p ∧ (p ∨ q) ≡ p,
nor the boundness laws
(p ∨ ¬p) ≡ (q ∨ ¬q) and ¬(p ∧ ¬q) ≡ ¬(q ∧ ¬q),
are adopted as axioms, nor – as we will show later – are they LD-provable.
One of the motivations for not allowing these laws is that we do not wish
to treat two tautologies as identical in meaning if their contents are com-
pletely different. For instance, the sentences, “Professor Grzegorczyk is in
the next room or he is not there” and “President Obama is in the next room
or he is not there” are both tautologies and hence logically equivalent, but
they are derived from claims concerning different persons, so their contents
are different. To quote Prof. Grzegorczyk: “Of course, mathematicians do
not concern themselves with anything outside imagined reality, where ev-
erything consistent is acceptable. They may thus consider all tautologies to
have the same meaning. However, a philosopher ought to be more careful.”4
A further interesting feature of the logic LD is concerned with possible
derived rules allowed in LD. As we showed, the formula ¬(ϕ∧ (¬ϕ∨ψ))∨ψ
is provable in LD, but the corresponding rule, that is, the classical rule of
modus ponens:
ϕ, (¬ϕ ∨ ψ)
ψ
,
is not derivable in LD in the sense that the premises may be satisfied by
a valuation that fails to satisfy the conclusion, as we will show in Section 4.
We end this section with a short discussion of the redundancy of the
LD-axiomatization presented above. It can be easily seen that some LD-
axioms are redundant, since they follow from the others. For example, the
reflexivity of ≡ follows from its symmetry and transitivity and the fact
that every formula is equivalent to some other formula. The proof can be
formalized easily enough.
4 Personal communication, 2012-01-21
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(1) ¬¬p ≡ p Ax17
(2) (¬¬p ≡ p) ≡ ((¬¬p ≡ p) ∧ ((¬¬p ≡ p) ≡ (p ≡ p)))
(Sub) to Ax3 p/¬¬p, q/p, r/p
(3) (¬¬p ≡ p) ∧ ((¬¬p ≡ p) ≡ (p ≡ p)) MPLD to (1) and (2)
(4) (¬¬p ≡ p) ≡ (p ≡ p) (∧2) to (3)
(5) p ≡ p MPLD to (1) and (4)
Moreover, it seems intuitively plausible that Ax5 and Ax6 should be
provable from each other using DeMorgan laws. This is indeed the case,
even though the formal proofs turn out to be quite lengthy. In the same
way, we can eliminate half of the axioms Ax7 through Ax16. More precisely,
let LDred be obtained from LD by removing Ax1, Ax5, Ax7, Ax8, Ax9, Ax14,
and Ax16. Then, the following holds:
Proposition 1
The axioms Ax1, Ax5, Ax7, Ax8, Ax9, Ax14, and Ax16 are provable
in LDred.
Proof.
Ax1: Already proved above.
Ax5: We have
(p ≡ q) ≡ (¬p ≡ ¬q)
≡ [(¬p ≡ ¬q) ∧ ((¬p ∧ ¬r) ≡ (¬q ∧ ¬r))]
≡ [(¬p ≡ ¬q) ∧ (¬(p ∨ r) ≡ ¬(q ∨ r))]
≡ [(p ≡ q) ∧ ((p ∨ r) ≡ (q ∨ r))].
Even though this outline seems simple and convincing enough, as it is easy
to check that each step involves only substitutions that are directly justified
by axioms and do not occur in the scope of a disjunction, expanding it to
a full formal proof is surprisingly tedious. Our computer-generated proof
consists of 8 axioms and 75 applications of rules. One could plausibly find
a significantly shorter proof, but we assume it would still consist of several
dozen lines, as intuitively obvious substitutions sometimes require rather
complicated formal manipulations.
We will prove Ax16 next to be able to use it in the remaining proofs.
Ax16: ¬(p ∧ q) ≡ ¬(¬¬p ∧ ¬¬q)
≡ ¬¬(¬p ∨ ¬q)
≡ (¬p ∨ ¬q).
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Ax7: (p ∨ q) ≡ ¬¬(p ∨ q)
≡ ¬(¬p ∧ ¬q)
≡ ¬(¬q ∧ ¬p)
≡ ¬¬(q ∨ p)
≡ (q ∨ p).
Ax8: (p ∨ (q ∨ r)) ≡ ¬¬(p ∨ (q ∨ r))
≡ ¬(¬p ∧ ¬(q ∨ r))
≡ ¬(¬p ∧ (¬q ∧ ¬r))
≡ ¬((¬p ∧ ¬q) ∧ ¬r)
≡ ¬(¬(p ∨ q) ∧ ¬r)
≡ ¬¬((p ∨ q) ∨ r)
≡ ((p ∨ q) ∨ r).
Ax9: (p ≡ (p ∨ p)) ≡ (¬p ≡ ¬(p ∨ p))
≡ (¬p ≡ (¬p ∧ ¬p)),
and the last equivalence is obtained from Ax12 by substitution.
Ax14: ((p ∨ (q ∧ r)) ≡ ((p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r)))
≡ (¬(p ∨ (q ∧ r)) ≡ ¬((p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r)))
≡ ((¬p ∧ ¬(q ∧ r)) ≡ (¬(p ∨ q) ∨ ¬(p ∨ r)))
≡ ((¬p ∧ (¬q ∨ ¬r)) ≡ ((¬p ∧ ¬q) ∨ (¬p ∧ ¬r))),
and again, the last element of the equivalence chain is obtained by substi-
tution, this time from Ax13. 
The mostly computer-generated full formal proofs and program sources
are available from the authors upon request. In Section 4 we will show that
all axioms of LDred are independent from each other.
3. Logic LD: semantics
The logic LD is originally given by Hilbert-style axiomatization. So, a natu-
ral problem to be solved is to provide a sound as well as complete semantics
for LD. In this section, on the basis of some modifications of non-Fregean
models for the logic SCI, we define a suitable class of structures for LD, and
then we prove its soundness and completeness. First, we introduce some
useful notions.
A structure (U,⊕,⊗) is said to be a distributive bisemilattice whenever
the following hold, for all a, b, c ∈ U and for any ⊙ ∈ {⊗,⊕}:
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• a⊙ b = b⊙ a, (commutativity of ⊗,⊕)
• a⊙ (b⊙ c) = (a⊙ b)⊙ c, (associativity of ⊗,⊕)
• a⊙ a = a, (idempotency of ⊗,⊕)
• a⊕ (b⊗ c) = (a⊕ b)⊗ (a⊕ c), (distributivity of ⊗ over ⊕)
• a⊗ (b⊕ c) = (a⊗ b)⊕ (a⊗ c). (distributivity of ⊕ over ⊗)
A de Morgan bisemilattice is a structure (U,∼,⊕,⊗) such that (U,⊕,⊗)
is a distributive bisemilattice and for all a, b ∈ U , the following hold:
• ∼∼a = a,
• ∼(a⊕ b) = ∼a ⊗∼b.
AGrzegorczyk algebra is a structure (U,∼,⊕,⊗, ◦) such that (U,∼,⊕,⊗)
is a de Morgan bisemilattice and for all a, b, c ∈ U , the following hold:
• a ◦ b = b ◦ a,
• a ◦ b = ∼a ◦ ∼b,
• a ◦ b = (a ◦ b)⊗ ((a ◦ c) ◦ (b ◦ c)),
• a ◦ b = (a ◦ b)⊗ ((a⊕ c) ◦ (b⊕ c)),
• a ◦ b = (a ◦ b)⊗ ((a⊗ c) ◦ (b⊗ c)).
Fact 2
A structure (U,∼,⊕,⊗, ◦) is a Grzegorczyk algebra if and only if the
following conditions hold, for all a, b, c ∈ U :
(LD1) a ◦ b = b ◦ a,
(LD2) a ◦ b = (a ◦ b)⊗ ((a ◦ c) ◦ (b ◦ c)),
(LD3) a ◦ b = ∼a ◦ ∼b,
(LD4) a ◦ b = (a ◦ b)⊗ ((a⊕ c) ◦ (b⊕ c)),
(LD5) a ◦ b = (a ◦ b)⊗ ((a⊗ c) ◦ (b⊗ c)),
(LD6) a⊕ b = b⊕ a,
(LD7) a⊕ (b⊕ c) = (a⊕ b)⊕ c,
(LD8) a⊕ a = a,
(LD9) a⊗ b = b⊗ a,
(LD10) a⊗ (b⊗ c) = (a⊗ b)⊗ c,
(LD11) a⊗ a = a,
(LD12) a⊗ (b⊕ c) = (a⊗ b)⊕ (a⊗ c),
(LD13) a⊕ (b⊗ c) = (a⊕ b)⊗ (a⊕ c),
(LD14) ∼(a⊕ b) = ∼a ⊗∼b,
(LD15) ∼(a⊗ b) = ∼a ⊕∼b,
(LD16) ∼∼a = a.
73
Joanna Golińska-Pilarek and Taneli Huuskonen
It is worth emphasizing the following fact:
Fact 3
Boolean algebras, Kleene algebras, and de Morgan algebras are Grze-
gorczyk algebras.
However, the converse of the above does not hold. The class of Grze-
gorczyk algebras is quite extensive and contains subclasses that form bases
for semantics of various non-classical logics of different types. Grzegorczyk
algebras will be a basis for structures of LD.
An LD-structure is of the form (U,∼,⊕,⊗, ◦,D), where:
• U,D are non-empty sets such that D ⊆ U ,
• (U,∼,⊕,⊗, ◦) is a Grzegorczyk algebra,
• For all a, b ∈ U , the following hold:
(a⊗ b) ∈ D if and only if a ∈ D and b ∈ D,
(a ◦ b) ∈ D if and only if a = b,
∼(a⊗∼a) ∈ D and (a⊗∼a) /∈ D.
Let M = (U,∼,⊕,⊗, ◦,D) be an LD-structure. A valuation on M is
any mapping v: V → U such that for all LD-formulas ϕ and ψ:
• v(¬ϕ) = ∼v(ϕ),
• v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = v(ϕ)⊗ v(ψ),
• v(ϕ ∨ ψ) = v(ϕ)⊕ v(ψ),
• v(ϕ ≡ ψ) = v(ϕ) ◦ v(ψ).
A formula ϕ is said to be satisfied in an LD-structure by a valuation v if
and only if v(ϕ) ∈ D. It is true in M whenever it is satisfied in M by all
the valuations on M, and it is LD-valid if it is true in all LD-structures.
We may think of LD-structures as variants of non-Fregean structures,
introduced by Suszko in [Suszko, 1971]. The universe of a non-Fregean struc-
ture consists of the correlates of sentences in a given language, and its ele-
ments are known as situations or states of affairs. The correlates of true
sentences are factual situations and the correlates of false sentences (ones
whose negations are true) are counterfactual situations. Unlike Suszko, we
do not insist on logical two-valuedness but allow for sentences that are nei-
ther true nor false; their correlates are undetermined situations. The set D
is the set of factual situations.
Example 4
Let U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, D = {2, 3}, and define the operations as follows:
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∼ 0 1 2 3
3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 3 0 0 0
1 0 3 0 0
2 0 0 3 0
3 0 0 0 3
⊗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
2 0 1 2 3
3 0 0 3 3
⊕ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 3 3
1 0 1 2 3
2 3 2 2 3
3 3 3 3 3
It can be verified that the above tables indeed define a Grzegorczyk
algebra, but the absorption laws do not hold, as 1⊕ (1⊗ 0) = 1⊗ (1⊕ 0) =
0 6= 1, for instance.
First, we will prove that LD is sound with respect to the class of all LD-
structures as defined above. Thus, we need to show that all LD-axioms are
LD-valid and all LD-rules preserve LD-validity. To be more precise, a rule
of the form ϕ1,...,ϕn
ψ1,...,ψm
, for n,m ≤ 2, is called weakly LD-correct whenever the
LD-validity of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn implies the LD-validity of ψ1, . . . , ψm, and strongly
LD-correct whenever for every LD-structureM and every valuation v onM
such that M, v |= ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, it holds that M, v |= ψ1, . . . , ψm.
Proposition 5
All the LD-rules except (Sub) are strongly LD-correct. Moreover,
(Sub) is weakly LD-correct.
Proof.
The proofs of the weak correctness of (Sub) and the strong correctness
of (∧1) and (∧2) are easy to carry out. So by way of example, we will show
the strong correctness of the rule (MPLD).
LetM = (U,∼,⊕,⊗, ◦,D) be an LD-structure and v a valuation onM
such that M, v |= ϕ ≡ ψ and M, v |= ϕ. By the assumption, v(ϕ ≡ ψ) ∈ D
and v(ϕ) ∈ D. Since v(ϕ ≡ ψ) ∈ D, we have also v(ϕ) ◦ v(ψ) ∈ D, so
v(ϕ) = v(ψ). Therefore v(ψ) ∈ D. Hence, the rule MPLD is strongly LD-
correct. 
Proposition 6
All the LD-axioms are LD-valid.
Proof.
LetM = (U,∼,⊕,⊗, ◦,D) be an LD-structure and let v be a valuation
on M. We need to show that if φ is an LD-axiom, then v(φ) ∈ D.
First, by the definition of an LD-structure, we have the following: v(p) =
v(p) iff v(p) ◦ v(p) ∈ D iff v(p ≡ p) ∈ D. Hence, the axiom Ax2 is LD-valid.
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By Fact 2(LD1), for all a, b ∈ U , (a ◦ b) = (b ◦ a). Therefore, (v(p) ◦ v(q)) =
(v(q) ◦ v(p)). On the other hand, by the definition of an LD-structure, we
have also: (v(p) ◦ v(q)) = (v(q) ◦ v(p)) iff (v(p) ◦ v(q)) ◦ (v(q) ◦ v(p)) ∈ D iff
v((p ≡ q) ≡ (q ≡ p)) ∈ D. Thus, axiom Ax2 is LD-valid. In a similar way, we
can prove LD-validity of axioms Ax3–Ax16. Generally, for i ∈ {3, . . . , 17},
LD-validity of axiom Axi follows from condition (LDi−1) of Fact 2. Fur-
thermore, by the definition of an LD-structure, axiom Ax18 is obviously
LD-valid. 
Propositions 5 and 6 yield soundness of the logic LD with respect to
the class of all LD-structures:
Proposition 7 (Soundness of LD)
Every LD-provable formula is LD-valid.
Now, we will proceed to completeness. Let R be the following binary
relation on the set of all LD-formulas:
ϕ R ψ if and only if ϕ ≡ ψ is provable in LD.
Fact 8
The relation R is an equivalence relation on the set of all LD-formulas.
Moreover, R is compatible with all LD-connectives.
Proof.
Let ϕ,ψ, ϑ be any LD-formulas. Clearly, ϕ ≡ ϕ is provable in LD, so R
is reflexive. Assume ϕRψ, that is, ϕ ≡ ψ is provable in LD. By axiom Ax2,
((ϕ ≡ ψ) ≡ (ψ ≡ ϕ)) is provable in LD. Thus, by the assumption, so is
ψ ≡ ϕ, which implies ψ R ϕ. Hence, R is symmetric. Now, assume that
ϕ R ψ and ψ R ϑ, which means that ϕ ≡ ψ and ψ ≡ ϑ are provable in LD.
Since R is symmetric, ψ R ϕ, so ψ ≡ ϕ is provable in LD. By axiom Ax3,
LD proves:
(ψ ≡ ϕ) ≡ [(ψ ≡ ϕ) ∧ ((ψ ≡ ϑ) ≡ (ϕ ≡ ϑ))].
Applying the rule (MPLD), and then (∧2), we obtain that LD proves:
(ψ ≡ ϑ) ≡ (ϕ ≡ ϑ).
Applying again the rule (MPLD) and the assumption ψ ≡ ϑ, we have that
ϕ ≡ ϑ is provable in LD, which implies ϕ R ϑ. Hence, R is transitive.
Assume then that ϕ1 R ϕ2 and ψ1 R ψ2. Then ¬ϕ1 R ¬ϕ2 by Ax4, so
R is compatible with ¬. Moreover,
ϕ1 ≡ ψ1 R ϕ2 ≡ ψ1 R ψ1 ≡ ϕ2 R ψ2 ≡ ϕ2 R ϕ2 ≡ ψ2,
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so by the transitivity of R, it follows that R is also compatible with ≡. The
proofs of compatibility with ∧ and ∨ are similar. 
By the above fact, we can define a structure MLD = (U,∼,⊕,⊗, ◦,D)
as follows:
• U = { |ϕ|R : ϕ is an LD-formula }, that is, U is the set of equivalence
classes of R on the set of all LD-formulas,
• D = { |ϕ|R : ϕ is provable in LD }, that is, D is the set of equivalence
classes of R on the set of all provable formulas in LD,
• For all |ϕ|R, |ψ|R ∈ U :
∼|ϕ|R
df= |¬ϕ|R, |ϕ|R ◦ |ψ|R
df= |ϕ ≡ ψ|R,
|ϕ|R ⊗ |ψ|R
df= |ϕ ∧ ψ|R, |ϕ|R ⊕ |ψ|R
df= |ϕ ∨ ψ|R.
Proposition 9
The structure MLD is an LD-structure.
Proof.
First, we will show thatMLD = (U,∼,⊕,⊗, ◦) is a Grzegorczyk algebra.
By Fact 2, it suffices to show that MLD satisfies all the conditions (LD1),
(LD2), . . . , (LD16). Let ϕ,ψ, ϑ be any LD-formulas.
Proof of (LD1)
|ϕ|R ◦ |ψ|R = |ϕ ≡ ψ|R = |ψ ≡ ϕ|R = |ψ|R ◦ |ϕ|R.
Proof of (LD2)
(|ϕ|R ◦ |ψ|R) = |ϕ ≡ ψ|R
= |(ϕ ≡ ψ) ∧ ((ϕ ≡ ϑ) ≡ (ψ ≡ ϑ))|R
= |ϕ ≡ ψ|R ⊗ |(ϕ ≡ vartheta) ≡ (ψ ≡ ϑ)|R
= (|ϕ|R ◦ |ψ|R)⊗ ((|ϕ|R ◦ |ϑ|R) ◦ (|ψ|R ◦ |ϑ|R)).
Proof of (LD3)
|ϕ|R ◦ |ψ|R = |ϕ ≡ ψ|R = |¬ϕ ≡ ¬ψ|R
= |¬ϕ|R ◦ |¬ψ|R = ∼|ϕ|R ◦ ∼|ψ|R.
Proof of (LD4)
|ϕ|R ◦ |ψ|R = |ϕ ≡ ψ|R
= |(ϕ ≡ ψ) ∧ ((ϕ ∨ ϑ) ≡ (ψ ∨ ϑ))|R
= |ϕ ≡ ψ|R ⊗ |(ϕ ∨ ϑ) ≡ (ψ ∨ ϑ)|R
= (|ϕ|R ◦ |ψ|R)⊗ ((|ϕ|R⊕ |ϑ|R) ◦ (|ψ|R⊕ |ϑ|R)).
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Proof of (LD5)
|ϕ|R ◦ |ψ|R = |ϕ ≡ ψ|R
= |(ϕ ≡ ψ) ∧ ((ϕ ∧ ϑ) ≡ (ψ ∧ ϑ))|R
= |ϕ ≡ ψ|R ⊗ |(ϕ ∧ ϑ) ≡ (ψ ∧ ϑ)|R
= (|ϕ|R ◦ |ψ|R)⊗ ((|ϕ|R⊗ |ϑ|R) ◦ (|ψ|R⊗ |ϑ|R)).
Proof of (LD6)
|ϕ|R ⊕ |ψ|R = |ϕ ∨ ψ|R = |ψ ∨ ϕ|R = |ψ|R ⊕ |ϕ|R.
Proof of (LD7)
|ϕ|R ⊕ (|ψ|R ⊕ |ϑ|R) = |ϕ ∨ (ψ ∨ ϑ)|R = |(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ ϑ|R
= (|ϕ|R ⊕ |ψ|R)⊕ |ϑ|R.
Proof of (LD8)
|ϕ|R ⊕ |ϕ|R = |ϕ ∨ ϕ|R = |ϕ|R.
Proof of (LD9)
|ϕ|R ⊗ |ψ|R = |ϕ ∧ ψ|R = |ψ ∧ ϕ|R = |ψ|R ⊗ |ϕ|R.
Proof of (LD10)
|ϕ|R ⊗ (|ψ|R ⊗ |ϑ|R) = |ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ ϑ)|R = |(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ ϑ|R
= (|ϕ|R ⊗ |ψ|R)⊗ |ϑ|R.
Proof of (LD11)
|ϕ|R ⊗ |ϕ|R = |ϕ ∧ ϕ|R = |ϕ|R.
Proof of (LD12)
|ϕ|R ⊗ (|ψ|R ⊕ |ϑ|R) = |ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ ϑ)|R = |(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ϑ)|R
= (|ϕ|R ⊗ |ψ|R)⊕ (|ϕ|R ⊗ |ϑ|R).
Proof of (LD13)
|ϕ|R ⊕ (|ψ|R ⊗ |ϑ|R) = |ϕ ∨ (ψ ∧ ϑ)|R = |(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ ϑ)|R
= (|ϕ|R ⊕ |ψ|R)⊗ (|ϕ|R ⊕ |ϑ|R).
Proof of (LD14)
∼(|ϕ|R ⊕ |ψ|R) = ∼|ϕ ∨ ψ|R = |¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)|R = |¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ|R
= |¬ϕ|R ⊗ |¬ψ|R = ∼|ϕ|R ⊗∼|ψ|R.
Proof of (LD15)
∼(|ϕ|R ⊗ |ψ|R) = ∼|ϕ ∧ ψ|R = |¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)|R = |¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ|R
= |¬ϕ|R ⊕ |¬ψ|R = ∼|ϕ|R ⊕∼|ψ|R.
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Proof of (LD16)
∼(∼|ϕ|R) = ∼|¬ϕ|R = |¬¬ϕ|R = |ϕ|R.
Hence, we have shown that (U,∼,⊕,⊗, ◦) is a Grzegorczyk algebra. Now, we
will prove that MLD satisfies all other conditions required in the definition
of LD-structures. Clearly, U and D are non-empty sets such that D ⊆ U .
By the definition of MLD, for any formula ϕ: |ϕ|R ∈ D if and only if ϕ
is provable in LD. Let |ϕ|R, |ψ|R ∈ U . Then, |ϕ|R ⊗ |ψ|R = |ϕ ∧ ψ|R ∈ D
iff ϕ ∧ ψ is provable in LD iff ϕ and ψ are provable in LD iff |ϕ|R ∈ D
and |ψ|R ∈ D. Therefore, |ϕ|R ⊗ |ψ|R ∈ D if and only if |ϕ|R ∈ D and
|ψ|R ∈ D. Furthermore, we have also: |ϕ|R ◦ |ψ|R = |ϕ ≡ ψ|R ∈ D iff
ϕ ≡ ψ is provable in LD iff ϕRψ iff |ϕ|R = |ψ|R. Hence, |ϕ|R ◦ |ψ|R ∈ D
if and only if |ϕ|R = |ψ|R. By axiom Ax18, for any formula ϕ, ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)
is provable in LD, so ∼(|ϕ|R ⊗ ∼|ϕ|R) ∈ D. On the other hand, for any
formula ϕ, ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ is not provable in LD, since otherwise by Proposition 7,
it would be true in all LD-structures, which is impossible. Therefore, we
obtain: (|ϕ|R ⊗∼|ϕ|R) 6∈ D. Hence, M
LD is an LD-structure. 
From now on, the structure MLD is referred to as canonical.
Proposition 10 (Completeness of LD)
For every LD-formula ϕ, if ϕ is LD-valid, then it is LD-provable.
Proof.
Let ϕ be an LD-valid formula, and let v be the valuation onMLD such
that v(ψ) = |ψ|R for every ψ. It is easy to check that v is indeed a valuation.
Now, by the assumption, v(ϕ) ∈ D, and hence ϕ is LD-provable. 
Finally, by Propositions 7 and 10, we obtain:
Theorem 11 (Soundness and Completeness of LD)
For every LD-formula ϕ, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. ϕ is LD-provable.
2. ϕ is LD-valid.
By the completeness theorem, LD-structures will be referred to as LD-
models.
Next, we consider LD-consistency.
Definition 12
Let S be a set of LD-formulas.
1. S is LD-satisfiable if there are an LD-modelM and a valuation v on M
such that for every ϕ ∈ S, it holds that M, v |= ϕ.
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2. S is LD-inconsistent if there is some formula ϕ such that S ⊢ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ.
Otherwise, S is LD-consistent.
Proposition 13
A set S of LD-formulas is LD-satisfiable if and only if S is LD-consistent.
Proof.
Assume first that S is LD-satisfiable. Let M be an LD-model and let
v be a valuation on M such that M, v |= S. Let ϕ be an LD-formula.
Suppose S ⊢ ϕ∧¬ϕ. Then,M, v |= ϕ∧¬ϕ, which means that v(ϕ∧¬ϕ) ∈ D,
so v(ϕ) ∈ D and v(¬ϕ) ∈ D, which contradicts the definition of an LD-
structure. Hence, S is LD-consistent.
Assume then that S is LD-consistent. We build a model in the same
way as the canonical model above. So, let R be the binary relation on
the set of all LD-formulas defined as: ϕRψ if and only if S ⊢ ϕ ≡ ψ. As
before, R is an equivalence relation compatible with all connectives, and
hence we can define a Grzegorczyk algebra (U,∼,⊕,⊗, ◦) from R exactly
as in the definition of the canonical model. The earlier proof works almost
verbatim. Let further D = { |ϕ|R : S ⊢ ϕ }. Again, the proof of the required
properties of D is otherwise essentially the same as before, but showing that
there is no ϕ such that both |ϕ|R ∈ D and ∼|ϕ|R ∈ D require some extra
care. Assume towards a contradiction that ϕ is a counterexample. Then it
follows from the definitions that S ⊢ ϕ and S ⊢ ¬ϕ, which contradicts the
assumption that S is LD-consistent. 
4. Some interesting properties
In [Grzegorczyk, 2011], Prof. Grzegorczyk raises important questions about
the relationship between equality of descriptions and material equivalence,
as well as the corresponding implications. Let us introduce the following
definitions:
• (p→ q) df= (¬p ∨ q) (classical implication)
• (p↔ q) df= (p→ q) ∧ (q → p) (classical equivalence)
• (p⇒ q) df= (p ≡ (p ∧ q)) (descriptive implication)
Now, the questions about relationships between descriptive and classical
equivalences as well as between descriptive and classical implications can be
formalized as follows:
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(Q1) Is the formula (p ≡ q) ≡ (p↔ q) provable in LD?
(Q2) Is the formula (p⇒ q) ≡ (p→ q) provable in LD?
Both questions have negative answers, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 14
1. The formula (p ≡ q) ≡ (p↔ q) is not provable in LD.
2. The formula (p⇒ q) ≡ (p→ q) is not provable in LD.
Proof.
Let (U,∼,⊕,⊗, ◦,D) be as in Example 4 above, and let v(p) = v(q) = 2.
Then
v(p→ q) = ∼v(p)⊕ v(q) = ∼2⊕ 2 = 1⊕ 2 = 2,
but
v(p⇒ q) = v(p) ◦ (v(p) ⊗ v(q)) = 2 ◦ (2⊗ 2) = 2 ◦ 2 = 3.
In the same way, we see that v(p↔ q) = 2 but v(p ≡ q) = 3. 
Next, we present some LD-provable formulas and derived rules as well as
classical results that fail in LD. Due to the excessive lengths of the formal
proofs, we omit the details of most of them, showing only outlines. The
models we use as counterexamples are listed in the Appendix.
Even though there are no explicit rules concerning disjunction, there is
a derived disjunction introduction rule.
Proposition 15
The following rule is strongly LD-correct:
ϕ
ψ ∨ ϕ
Proof.
AssumeM, v |= ϕ. The formula ψ ∨ ¬ψ is LD-valid, so we get M, v |=
ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ ¬ψ). Further,
ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ ¬ψ) ≡ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
≡ ((ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ ϕ) ∧ ((ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ ¬ψ)
≡ ((ϕ ∨ ϕ) ∧ (ψ ∨ ϕ)) ∧ ((ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ ¬ψ),
whence M, v |= ψ ∨ ϕ. 
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Proposition 16
The formula (p ≡ p) ≡ (q ≡ q) is not LD-provable.
Proof.
See Example 36 in the Appendix. 
Proposition 17
The formula ¬(p ≡ ¬p) is not LD-provable.
Proof.
See Example 38 in the Appendix. Now, actually for any a ∈ U , it holds
that ∼(a ◦ ∼a) = 2 /∈ D, so there is no valuation v such that
M, v |= ¬(p ≡ ¬p). 
Note that there cannot be any LD-model M and valuation v such that
M, v |= p ≡ ¬p, as v(p ∧ ¬p) /∈ D but v(p ∨ ¬p) ∈ D.
Fact 3 shows that many familiar types of algebras are also Grzegorczyk
algebras. However, there are Grzegorczyk algebras that do not belong to any
of those types, and they often seem to be complicated and difficult to un-
derstand intuitively. However, they do illustrate various unexpected aspects
of LD. For instance, we can show the failure of the classical modus ponens
rule, despite the provability of the corresponding formula, by constructing
a suitable model and choosing a valuation that satisfies the premises but not
the supposed conclusion. Moreover, it follows directly from the definition of
an LD-model that if a formula ϕ is satisfied in a modelM by a valuation v,
then ¬ϕ is not satisfied by v in M, but the converse does not hold, as we
saw above. This trait of LD contrasts strongly with most other well-known
logics, that is, ones that follow the negation clause of Tarski’s truth defini-
tion. On the other hand, LD is also quite unlike intuitionistic logic, as there
is no negation introduction rule, but the axioms include DeMorgan’s laws
and double negation is treated classically. It follows from this combination of
DeMorgan’s laws, a classical conjunction, and a non-standard negation, that
also disjunction behaves in an unexpected way. Indeed, the formula p ≡ ¬p
is unsatisfiable and (p ≡ ¬p) ∨ ¬(p ≡ ¬p) is a tautology, but ¬(p ≡ ¬p) is
not provable. Hence, the connection between the truth values of a disjunc-
tion and the disjuncts is less definite than in classical logic. This property is,
at least to a degree, in accordance with the philosophical motivations that
LD is based on, as the LD-provability of a formula gives us information not
only of its necessary truth, but also of its connection to the axioms.
The soundness of LD with respect to the class of LD-models allows us
to derive further unprovability results.
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Proposition 18
The following formulas are not provable in LD:
1. (ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ)) ≡ ϕ.
2. (ϕ ∧ (ϕ ∨ ψ)) ≡ ϕ.
3. (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ≡ (ψ ∨ ¬ψ).
4. (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) ⇒ ψ.
5. ϕ⇒ (ψ ∨ ¬ψ).
Moreover, the following rule is not strongly LD-correct:
(∨1)
ϕ,¬ϕ ∨ ψ
ψ
.
Proof.
For (1) and (2), see Example 34 in the Appendix. For (3), (4), and (5),
see Example 35. For (∨1), see Example 37. 
Note that the formulas (3), (4), and (5) are instances of the classical
paradoxes of equivalence and implication: “any true statements are equiva-
lent to each other”, “false implies everything”, and “the truth is implied by
anything”, respectively. Hence their failure indicates that LD indeed avoids
these paradoxes.
Now, we can prove that all the axioms of LDred are independent
of each other. By a quasi LD-structure we will mean a structure M =
(U,∼,⊗,⊕, ◦,D) such that U,D are nonempty sets, D ⊆ U , ∼ is a unary
operation on U and ⊗,⊕, ◦ are binary operations on U . The notions of val-
uation, satisfaction, and the truth in a quasi LD-structure are defined in
the same way as for LD-models.
Proposition 19
Let S = {Ax2,Ax3,Ax4,Ax6,Ax10,Ax11,Ax12,Ax13,Ax15,Ax17,Ax18}.
Then, for each ϕ ∈ S, there is a quasi LD-structureMϕ such thatMϕ 6|= ϕ
but for each ψ ∈ S \ ϕ, it holds that Mϕ |= ψ.
Proof.
We will list the structures in the Appendix. 
So, the set S forms an independent set of axioms for LD.
5. Alternative versions of LD
During discussions about LD in seminar meetings, some alternative forms
of Ax3 were suggested. One of the motivations for adopting Ax3 was to ex-
press the transitivity of descriptive equivalence, but at least superficially,
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Ax3 appears to say something stronger. Therefore, it was natural to con-
sider alternative versions and their respective consequences. As we men-
tioned above in Section 2, the original version of Ax3 as given in [Grzegor-
czyk, 2011] was different, but our version is the intended one, as published
in Errata [2012]. We will now discuss the logics obtained by replacing Ax3
with two alternative forms: Ax3∗ and Ax3′. The axiom Ax3∗ is the origi-
nal version presented in [Grzegorczyk, 2011], whereas Ax3′ was proposed
by Stanis law Krajewski, and it is already mentioned in the Errata. These
axioms have the following forms:
Ax3
∗ (p ≡ q) ≡ [(p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)],
Ax3
′ [(p ≡ q) ∧ (q ≡ r)] ⇒ (p ≡ r).
Recall that ⇒ is an LD-implication defined as:
ϕ⇒ ψ df= ϕ ≡ (ϕ ∧ ψ).
Thus, the explicit form of axiom Ax3′ is:
[(p ≡ q) ∧ (q ≡ r)] ≡ [(p ≡ q) ∧ (q ≡ r) ∧ (p ≡ r)].
By LD∗ (resp. LD′) we will denote the logic obtained from LD by replacing
the axiom Ax3 with Ax3∗ (resp. Ax3′). It is again easy to see that both logics
are consistent, since under the interpretation of ≡ as the usual classical
equivalence, both axioms Ax3∗ and Ax3′ are classical tautologies.
First, we will discuss the logic LD∗. We can actually prove Ax3 in LD∗,
as the following proof shows:
(1) [(p ≡ q) ≡ ((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r))] ≡
≡ [((p ≡ q) ≡ ((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)))∧
∧(((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ (((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)) ∧ (p ≡ q)))]
(Sub) to Ax6 for p/(p ≡ q), q/((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)), r/(p ≡ q)
(2) (p ≡ q) ≡ ((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)] Ax3∗
(3) ((p ≡ q) ≡ ((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)))∧
∧(((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ (((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)) ∧ (p ≡ q)))
(MPLD) to (1) and (2)
(4) ((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ (((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)) ∧ (p ≡ q)) (∧2) to (3)
(5) [((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ (((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)) ∧ (p ≡ q))] ≡
≡ {(((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ (p ≡ q)) ≡
≡ ((((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ (p ≡ q))}
(Sub) to Ax3∗ for p/((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ q)),
q/(((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)) ∧ (p ≡ q)), r/(p ≡ q)
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(6) (((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ (p ≡ q)) ≡
≡ ((((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ (p ≡ q))
(MPLD) to (4) and (5)
(7) (p ≡ q) ≡ ((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ q)) (Sub) to Ax12 for p/(p ≡ q)
(8) [(p ≡ q) ≡ ((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ q))] ≡ [((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ (p ≡ q)]
(Sub) to Ax2 for p/(p ≡ q), q/((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ q))
(9) ((p ≡ q) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ (p ≡ q) (MPLD) to (7) and (8)
(10) (((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ (p ≡ q) (MPLD) to (6) and (9)
(11) (((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ ((p ≡ q) ∧ ((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)))
(Sub) to Ax10
for p/((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)), q/(p ≡ q)
(12) [(((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ (p ≡ q)] ≡
≡ {[(((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r))∧(p ≡ q)) ≡ ((p ≡ q)∧((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)))] ≡
≡ [(p ≡ q) ≡ ((p ≡ q) ∧ ((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)))]}
(Sub) to Ax3∗ for p/(((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)) ∧ (p ≡ q)),
q/(p ≡ q), r/((p ≡ q) ∧ ((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)))
(13) [(((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)) ∧ (p ≡ q)) ≡ ((p ≡ q) ∧ ((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)))] ≡
≡ [(p ≡ q) ≡ ((p ≡ q) ∧ ((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r)))]
(MPLD) to (10) and (12)
(14) (p ≡ q) ≡ ((p ≡ q) ∧ ((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r))) (MPLD) to (11) and (13).
Thus, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 20
Every LD-formula ϕ that is provable in LD is also provable in LD∗.
It turns out that replacing Ax3 with Ax3∗ defeats the purpose of intro-
ducing a new connective, as the following proposition shows:
Proposition 21
The following rules are strongly correct in LD∗:
p↔ q
p ≡ q
p ≡ q
p↔ q
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Proof.
First, it is easy to see that (p ≡ p) ≡ (q ≡ q) holds for any p, q, as both
sides are equal to (p ≡ q) ≡ (p ≡ q), by Ax3∗ and symmetry. Let us denote
this common value by 1. Then,
(p ≡ 1) ≡ ((p ≡ 1) ≡ (1 ≡ 1))
≡ ((p ≡ 1) ≡ 1),
whence p ≡ (p ≡ 1). In particular, if ϕ is provable in LD∗, then so is ϕ ≡ 1.
Hence,
p ∨ 1 ≡ p ∨ (p ∨ ¬p)
≡ p ∨ ¬p
≡ 1.
Moreover,
p ≡ (p ≡ 1)
≡ (p ≡ 1) ∧ ((p ∧ 1) ≡ (1 ∧ 1))
≡ p ∧ (p ∧ 1),
so (p ∧ 1) ≡ p for all p.
If we substitute 1 for q in axioms Ax5 and Ax6 and simplify, we get,
respectively,
p ≡ p ∧ ((p ∧ r) ≡ r),
p ≡ p ∧ (p ∨ r).
So, it follows that
(p ∧ q) ≡ [(p ∧ q) ∧ ((p ∧ q) ≡ p) ∧ ((p ∧ q) ≡ q)].
By applying DeMorgan’s laws and some further manipulations, we also get
(¬p ∧ ¬q) ≡ [(¬p ∧ ¬q) ∧ ((p ∧ q) ≡ p) ∧ ((p ∧ q) ≡ q)].
So,
(p↔ q) ≡ [(p↔ q) ∧ ((p ∧ q) ≡ p) ∧ ((p ∧ q) ≡ q)].
From this and the transitivity of ≡, the claim follows.
On the other hand, we can prove the tautology q ↔ q as in the classical
case, and hence (q ↔ q) ≡ 1 and further r ≡ (r ≡ (q ↔ q)), for any r.
Moreover,
(p ≡ q) ≡ [(p ≡ q) ∧ ((p↔ q) ≡ (q ↔ q))],
and therefore (p ≡ q) ≡ ((p ≡ q) ∧ (p↔ q)). 
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So, LD∗ is effectively just an unnecessarily complex reformulation of
classical propositional logic. It also follows that the converse of Proposi-
tion 20 does not hold.
Let us now consider Ax3′. We can define an LD′-model by changing the
definition of an LD-model appropriately, that is, by replacing the condition
a◦b = (a◦b)⊗((a◦c)◦(b◦c)) with (a◦b)⊗(b◦c) = (a◦b)⊗(b◦c)⊗(a◦c). Now,
every LD′-provable formula is true in every LD′-model, which can be proved
essentially in the same way as in the case of LD. However, the converse
implication does not hold. Let ϕ be the formula (p ≡ q) ≡ ((p ∧ p) ≡ q).
The structure presented in Example 39 satisfies all LD′-axioms and rules but
does not satisfy ϕ, which means that ϕ is not LD′-provable. On the other
hand, ϕ is clearly true in every LD′-model, as ≡ is interpreted as equality.
Moreover, the philosophical motivations for LD suggest that ϕ should be
true. Therefore, we will not study LD′ any further.
6. Conclusions
We have defined the logic LD in terms of syntactic deduction rules and
axioms, defined a corresponding semantics, and proved a soundness and
completeness theorem. We have given several examples of classical laws that
hold in LD as well as laws that fail in LD. We have shown that the original
axiomatization is redundant and found an independent set of axioms. We
have considered two proposed alternative forms of Ax3 and found both of
them unsatisfying as replacements for Ax3.
In studying the properties of LD, we have found computer-assisted
methods indispensable. We developed the following tools for LD:
• Two proof checkers, accepting two different input syntaxes and using
different methods for checking, generally being as independent as pos-
sible apart from the fact that both were written by the second author.
• An automatic proof builder, which accepts a set of targets and some
intermediate steps and attempts to output a full formal proof of the
targets, in a format suitable for either checker or LATEX.
• A model checker, which inputs a finite structure in the signature of LD
as well as some deduction rules and formulas, and checks whether the
structure obeys the rules and satisfies the formulas.
As we mentioned before, the programs and sample input and output
files are available on request.
There are several interesting questions about LD that we have not an-
swered here.
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1. Is LD decidable?
We conjecture LD has the finite model property, formulated in the fol-
lowing way due to the non-classical negation:
For every formula ϕ such that there are an LD-model M and a valua-
tion v on M such that M, v 6|= ϕ, there are a finite LD-model M′ and
a valuation v on M′ such that M′, v′ 6|= ϕ.
For logics with a Tarskian negation, this formulation is, of course, equiv-
alent with the usual one. In the case of LD, however, this is the form that
we need. Indeed, if the conjecture is true, we can prove the decidability
of LD in the usual way.
2. If LD is decidable, what is the complexity of deciding whether an LD-
formula is provable?
Our conjecture about the finite model property, mentioned above, is
based on a construction of a finite model whose size is doubly expo-
nential in the size of the formula. If the construction is correct, there
is an obvious decision algorithm that runs in doubly exponential space
and hence triply exponential time: simply search for a small enough
counterexample.
3. Is the classical modus ponens rule weakly correct for LD?
We have a counterexample showing that MP is not strongly correct.
However, we do not know whether it is weakly correct.
4. Are there other interesting variants of LD?
We showed that LD∗ is too strong and LD′ too weak to formalize the
motivating philosophical ideas. However, Ax3′ appears plausible in its
own right, and instead of replacing Ax3 with Ax3′, one could simply
add Ax3′ to LD. So far, our preliminary results suggest such an extension
would be similar to LD, with only minor technical differences.
5. Can one generate LD-proofs fully automatically in practice?
Our prover needs a human-generated outline consisting of intermediate
steps, which it then attempts to expand to a full proof by applying some
derived rules. If the outline is not sufficiently detailed, the prover fails.
The non-classical nature of negation and disjunction prevents a straight-
forward implementation of a tableau-based prover. So far, we have not
found a practical proof strategy for LD. Of course, a brute-force search
is possible in principle.
6. Is there a normal form for LD-formulas?
A suitable normal form may simplify the task of finding an automatic
proof system, among other things.
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Appendix
In this section, we will list the models that show the unprovability claims
made in the main text.
Example 22
Here is the simplest possible LD-model, unique up to isomorphism.
U = {0, 1}, D = {1}
∼ 0 1
1 0
◦ 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
⊗ 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
⊕ 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
Example 23
This model shows that Ax2 is independent of LDred. That is, the for-
mula (p ≡ q) ≡ (q ≡ p) is not true in it, but all other axioms of LDred
are.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, D = {3, 4, 5}; v(p) = 0, v(q) = 2.
∼ 0 1 2 3 4 5
5 4 3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 3 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 4 1 2 1 2
2 2 1 4 1 2 1
3 1 2 1 4 1 2
4 2 1 2 1 4 1
5 1 1 1 1 1 3
⊗ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 1 2 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 2 1 2 1
3 1 1 1 3 3 3
4 2 1 2 3 4 3
5 1 1 1 3 3 5
⊕ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 2 2 4 4 4
1 2 1 2 3 4 3
2 2 2 2 4 4 4
3 4 3 4 3 4 3
4 4 4 4 4 4 4
5 4 3 4 3 4 5
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Example 24
The axiom (p ≡ q) ≡ [(p ≡ q) ∧ ((p ≡ r) ≡ (q ≡ r))] (Ax3) is indepen-
dent.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, D = {2, 3}; v(p) = 0, v(q) = 0, v(r) = 0.
∼ 0 1 2 3
3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 2 0 0 0
1 0 3 0 0
2 0 0 3 0
3 0 0 0 2
⊗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
2 0 0 2 3
3 0 0 3 3
⊕ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 3 3
1 0 1 3 3
2 3 3 2 3
3 3 3 3 3
Example 25
The axiom (p ≡ q) ≡ (¬p ≡ ¬q) (Ax4) is independent.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, D = {2, 3}; v(p) = 1, v(q) = 1.
∼ 0 1 2 3
3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 2 0 0 0
1 0 3 0 0
2 0 0 2 0
3 0 0 0 2
⊗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
2 0 0 2 3
3 0 0 3 3
⊕ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 3 3
1 0 1 3 3
2 3 3 2 3
3 3 3 3 3
Example 26
The axiom (p ≡ q) ≡ [(p ≡ q)∧ ((p∧r) ≡ (q∧r))] (Ax6) is independent.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, D = {2, 3}; v(p) = 3, v(q) = 3, v(r) = 1.
∼ 0 1 2 3
3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 3 0 0 0
1 0 2 0 0
2 0 0 2 0
3 0 0 0 3
⊗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1
2 0 0 2 2
3 0 1 2 3
⊕ 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3
1 1 1 3 3
2 2 3 2 3
3 3 3 3 3
Example 27
The axiom (p ∧ q) ≡ (q ∧ p) (Ax10) is independent.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, D = {2, 3}; v(p) = 0, v(q) = 1.
∼ 0 1 2 3
3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 2 0 0 0
1 0 2 0 0
2 0 0 2 0
3 0 0 0 2
⊗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1
2 0 0 2 2
3 1 1 3 3
⊕ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 2 2
1 1 1 3 3
2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3
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Example 28
The axiom (p ∧ (q ∧ r)) ≡ ((p ∧ q) ∧ r) (Ax11) is independent.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, D = {3, 4, 5}; v(p) = 0, v(q) = 0, v(r) = 4.
∼ 0 1 2 3 4 5
5 4 3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 3 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 3 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 3 2 2 2
3 2 2 2 3 2 2
4 2 2 2 2 3 2
5 2 2 2 2 2 3
⊗ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 0 2 2 1 1
1 0 1 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 2 2 2 3 3 3
4 1 1 2 3 4 4
5 1 1 2 3 4 5
⊕ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 1 2 3 4 4
1 1 1 2 3 4 4
2 2 2 2 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
4 4 4 3 3 4 5
5 4 4 3 3 5 5
Example 29
The axiom p ≡ (p ∧ p) (Ax12) is independent.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, D = {2, 3}; v(p) = 0.
∼ 0 1 2 3
3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 2 1 1 1
1 1 2 1 1
2 1 1 2 1
3 1 1 1 2
⊗ 0 1 2 3
0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 2 2
3 1 1 2 3
⊕ 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
3 2 2 2 2
Example 30
The axiom (p ∧ (q ∨ r)) ≡ ((p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r)) (Ax13) is independent.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, D = {2, 3}; v(p) = 1, v(q) = 1, v(r) = 2.
∼ 0 1 2 3
3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 2 0 0 0
1 0 2 0 0
2 0 0 2 0
3 0 0 0 2
⊗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
2 0 0 2 2
3 0 0 2 3
⊕ 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 3 3
1 1 1 3 3
2 3 3 2 3
3 3 3 3 3
Example 31
The axiom ¬(p ∨ q) ≡ (¬p ∧ ¬q) (Ax15) is independent.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, D = {2, 3}; v(p) = 0, v(q) = 1.
∼ 0 1 2 3
2 3 0 1
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 2 0 0 0
1 0 2 0 0
2 0 0 2 0
3 0 0 0 2
⊗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1
2 0 1 2 2
3 0 1 2 3
⊕ 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3
1 1 1 2 3
2 2 2 2 3
3 3 3 3 3
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Example 32
The axiom ¬¬p ≡ p (Ax17) is independent.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, D = {4, 5, 6, 7}; v(p) = 1.
∼ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7 6 5 4 3 1 2 0
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
⊗ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 0 1 2 3 3 3 3 3
4 0 1 2 3 4 4 4 4
5 0 1 2 3 4 5 4 5
6 0 1 2 3 4 4 6 6
7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
⊕ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1 1 3 3 4 5 6 7
2 2 3 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 3 3 3 3 4 5 6 7
4 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 7
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 7
6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 7
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Example 33
The axiom ¬(p ∧ ¬p) (Ax18) is independent.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, D = {3}; v(p) = 1.
∼ 0 1 2 3
3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 3 0 0 0
1 0 3 0 0
2 0 0 3 0
3 0 0 0 3
⊗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1
2 0 1 2 2
3 0 1 2 3
⊕ 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3
1 1 1 2 3
2 2 2 2 3
3 3 3 3 3
Example 34
In this model, the absorption law (p ∧ (p ∨ q)) ≡ p does not hold.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, D = {2, 3}; v(p) = 1, v(q) = 0.
∼ 0 1 2 3
3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 3 0 0 0
1 0 3 0 0
2 0 0 3 0
3 0 0 0 3
⊗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
2 0 1 2 3
3 0 0 3 3
⊕ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 3 3
1 0 1 2 3
2 3 2 2 3
3 3 3 3 3
Example 35
Here the formulas (p∨¬p) ≡ (q∨¬q), (p∧¬p)⇒ q, and ¬q ⇒ (p∨¬p)
are not true.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, D = {2, 3}; v(p) = 1, v(q) = 0.
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∼ 0 1 2 3
3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 3 0 0 0
1 0 3 0 0
2 0 0 3 0
3 0 0 0 3
⊗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1
2 0 1 2 2
3 0 1 2 3
⊕ 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3
1 1 1 2 3
2 2 2 2 3
3 3 3 3 3
Example 36
In this model, the formula (p ≡ p) ≡ (q ≡ q) is not true.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, D = {3, 4, 5}; v(p) = 0, v(q) = 1.
∼ 0 1 2 3 4 5
5 4 3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 5 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 3 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 5 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 5 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 3 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 5
⊗ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2 0 0 2
2 0 2 2 0 0 2
3 0 0 0 3 3 3
4 0 0 0 3 4 3
5 0 2 2 3 3 5
⊕ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 2 2 3 3 5
1 2 1 2 5 5 5
2 2 2 2 5 5 5
3 3 5 5 3 3 5
4 3 5 5 3 4 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Example 37
In this model, the modus ponens rule is not correct. That is, the for-
mula p ∧ (p→ q) is satisfied by a valuation that does not satisfy q.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, D = {4, 5}; v(p) = 4, v(q) = 3.
∼ 0 1 2 3 4 5
5 4 3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 5 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 5 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 5 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 5 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 5 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 5
⊗ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1
2 0 1 2 0 1 2
3 0 0 0 3 3 3
4 0 1 1 3 4 4
5 0 1 2 3 4 5
⊕ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 1 2 4 4 5
2 2 2 2 5 5 5
3 3 4 5 3 4 5
4 4 4 5 4 4 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Example 38
In this example, the formula ¬(p ≡ ¬p) is not true, even though one
can prove a contradiction from p ≡ ¬p. Thus, there cannot be a negation
introduction rule.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3}, D = {3}; v(p) = 0.
∼ 0 1 2 3
3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3
0 3 2 2 2
1 2 3 2 2
2 2 2 3 2
3 2 2 2 3
⊗ 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1
2 0 0 2 2
3 0 1 2 3
⊕ 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3
1 1 1 3 3
2 2 3 2 3
3 3 3 3 3
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Example 39
This example shows that the formula (p ≡ q) ≡ ((p ∧ p) ≡ q) is not
LD
′-provable.
U = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, D = {3, 4, 5}; v(p) = 2, v(q) = 0.
∼ 0 1 2 3 4 5
5 4 3 2 1 0
◦ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 5 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 5 4 0 1 1
2 0 4 5 1 0 0
3 0 0 1 5 4 0
4 1 1 0 4 5 1
5 1 1 0 0 1 5
⊗ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 1
2 0 1 1 0 0 1
3 0 0 0 4 4 4
4 0 0 0 4 4 4
5 0 1 1 4 4 5
⊕ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 1 1 4 4 5
1 1 1 1 5 5 5
2 1 1 1 5 5 5
3 4 5 5 4 4 5
4 4 5 5 4 4 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5
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